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Abstract—To address the issues like identity theft and se-
curity threats, a continuously evolving technology known as
biometrics is presently being deployed in a wide range of
personal, government, and commercial applications. Despite the
great progress in the field, several exigent problems have yet to
be addressed to unleash biometrics full potential. This article
aims to present an overview of biometric research and more
importantly the significant progress that has been attained over
the recent years. The paper is envisaged to further not only
the understanding of general audiences and policy makers but
also interdisciplinary research. Most importantly, this article is
intended to complement earlier articles with updates on most
recent topics and developments related to e.g. spoofing, evasion,
obfuscation, face reconstruction from DNA, Big data issues in
biometrics, etc.
Index Terms—Biometrics, Face Recognition, Fingerprint
Recognition, Iris Recognition, Security, Privacy, Forensics
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity theft and security threats are growing concerns
in our digital society. To address these issues, an emerging
and continuously evolving technology known as biometrics
has become widespread [1]. There is a reasonably permanent
link between an individual and their biometric traits [2],
biometrics thus can be employed in covert person recognition
or in applications where an individual may attempt to conceal
their true identity (e.g., using forged documents to cross
borders). Although, biometrics has several advantages (e.g.,
nonrepudiation) over tokens or passwords, it suffers from
false matches [11]. Thus, in several applications, a multi-
factor authentication technique, which integrates biometrics
with tokens and/or passwords, may be a better choice.
Despite great progress, several exigent problems have yet
to be addressed to unleash biometrics’ full potential. Various
traits for biometrics have been investigated and published [5]
as also can be seen in Fig. 1c. Though there exist several
biometrics survey/review papers [4–6, 9, 10, 15] and books
[2, 3, 11], their scopes are limited. For instance, [4] is
focused mainly on physical biometric traits. [5, 6, 9, 10, 15]
discuss only about mobile-, wearable-, behavioral-, and soft-
biometrics, respectively. Similarly, [2, 3, 11] only provides
description of fusion, spoofing, and fingerprint, respectively.
Moreover, these publications do not give details of newly
emergent topics. This paper significantly differs from previous
articles in that it summarizes the evolution of biometrics
including rising traits, research interests and applications.
Specifically, this article aims to present an overview of biomet-
ric research and more importantly the significant progress that
has been attained over the recent years. The paper is envisaged
to further not only the understanding of general audiences and
policy makers but also interdisciplinary research. Most impor-
tantly, this article is intended to complement earlier articles
with updates on most recent topics and developments related
to e.g. spoofing, evasion, obfuscation, face reconstruction from
DNA, big data issues in biometrics, etc.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF BIOMETRICS
Biometrics is attracting so much interest of people from all
walks of life. This section thus discusses the basic issues of
biometrics by answering the following questions:
What is biometrics?
Biometrics is the measurement and statistical analysis of
people’s biological (e.g., face) and behavioral (e.g., voice)
characteristics (see Fig. 1a), which can be used to recognize or
identify individuals [1]. The term biometrics is derived from
the ancient Greek words ‘bio’ meaning life and ‘metrikos’
meaning to measure [2]. Biometrics is based on “who you
are” rather than “what you have” (e.g., an ID card) or “what
you know” (e.g., a password).
Does everyone have unique biometric traits?
In principle, each person has different biometric patterns [11].
However, the underlying scientific basis of biometric traits
individuality (or uniqueness), i.e., quantitative information
regarding the likelihood that another person could exhibit the
same set of features, has not been formally established [1].
Thus, validity of biometric evidence is now being challenged
in several court cases. A scientific basis for establishing such
individuality is very important, which will lead to admis-
sibility of biometrics identification in the courts of law as
well as establishment of an upper bound on performance
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Fig. 2. A large number of body traits have been proposed and used for
person recognition. Fingerprint, face, and iris modalities shown in the
first row are the three most popular biometric traits in deployed sys-
tems. Traits such as palmprint and DNA (depicted in the second row) have
legacy databases and are currently being used primarily in law enforce-
ment and forensics. The third row shows traits that have been deployed
in commercial applications, primarily for verification operation (one-to-
one matching). Finally, the last two rows show traits like gait, ear, sclera,
keystroke dynamics, ECG, and EEG signals, which have been proposed
by researchers for person recognition in niche applications, but are yet to
attain su cient level of technological maturity for deployment.
lar application. Often, other practical issues such as through-
put, cost, return on investment (ROI), user experience, template
size, resistance to spoof and template attacks, and ease of sys-
tem integration must also be given due consideration during the
selection of a biometric trait.
Due to the diverse nature of biometric applications (e.g., mo-
bile phone unlocking to international border crossing), no sin-
gle biometric trait is likely to be optimal and satisfy the re-
quirements of all applications. In many cases, a combination
or fusion of multiple biometric traits may be required to attain
the desired level of performance; such systems are generally
referred to as multibiometric systems (Ross et al., 2006). One
such example is the Aadhaar system in India, where there is a
need to distinguish between individuals in a database involv-
ing hundreds of millions of identities7. Therefore, the Aadhaar
system uses all ten fingerprints and both irides of subjects for
de-duplication of identities.
It is important to emphasize that the design of a biometric
system generally involves a complex interplay of factors re-
lated to user interaction (with the biometric sensor), the end-
application, and the biometric recognition technology. For ex-
ample, consider a financial application like Internet banking,
where the overarching objective of using a biometric system is
to minimize the losses incurred due to fraudulent transactions
without causing too much inconvenience to the genuine cus-
tomers. In this scenario, the bank needs to decide whether a
particular transaction should be authorized or declined. Hence,
the level of authentication required will depend on the risk asso-
ciated with a transaction. A simple authentication scheme (e.g.,
account number and PIN) may be su cient for an account bal-
ance inquiry, while a much higher level of identity assurance
(e.g., a strong biometric match) may be required to perform a
high-value funds transfer. It is also possible to combine the bio-
metric match score with other contextual information such as
customer’s past transaction history and current location of the
customer to generate an overall risk score, which can form the
basis for the authorization decision. Thus, designing a biomet-
ric system not only requires knowledge of biometric technol-
ogy, but also a good understanding of application requirements
and issues related to human factors, ergonomics, and environ-
mental variables.
2.2. Core Research Challenges in Biometrics
The main objective of a biometric system is to recognize in-
dividuals accurately. This in turn implies that a biometric sys-
tem must have low recognition error rates. While false match
rate (FMR) and false non-match rate (FNMR) quantify the er-
rors in a verification system, false positive identification rate
(FPIR) and false negative identification rate (FNIR) are used
as the error metrics in an identification system. The condi-
tional entropy8 H(Y |Yˆ), where Y and Yˆ are the true and pre-
dicted identities, respectively, is a function of the recognition
7As on 15th December 2014, more than 720 million Aadhaar numbers have
been issued.
8Intuitively, H(Y |X) measures the uncertainty in Y given X.
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Fig. 1: (a) Plenty of body characteristics have been proposed and used for person recognition. Fingerprint, face, and iris
modalities are the most adopted biometric traits. Novel traits in smartphone like touchscreen patterns, GPS data have been too
proposed by researchers for biometric recognition, but are yet to attain sufficient level of technological maturity for deployment
at mass level. (b) A generic biometric recognition system with an automated fingerprint identification system as an example.
Each biometric verification system has two stages: enrollment and verification. The enrollment phase produces an association
between a biometric characteristic and its identity. While, in the verification phase, an enrolled user claims an identity, which
the system verifies on the basis of the user’s biometric feature set. For fingerprint recognition, the sensor captures a digital
image of a legitimate user’s fingerprint. Its minutiae (salient features) are extracted and stored as a template in an enrolment
database.These minutiae take the form of locations (x and y coordinates) and orientations (θ) of abrupt ends and junctions of
fingerprint ridges. During identification, fingerprint minutiae are extracted from a query print in the same way and compared
with the minutiae of the templates stored in the enrolment database. The number of minutiae that have similar x, y and θ
coordinates forms a basis for determining the identity of the user. (c) The number of papers for specific biometric trait available
via the IEEE-Xplore and the ACM Digital Library. (d) Examples of soft biometric traits. (e) Faces in the wild. (f) Points of
attack in a generic biometric system. (g) Left: Face spoofing using a 3D mask. Middle: Fingerprint spoofing using a fake
silicone fingerprint. Right: Iris spoofing using an artificial eyeball. (h) Scenarios for evasion and obfuscation.
3of a biometric system. Existing individuality methods use
feature representation or match score, but encounter lack of
robust statistical models and entropy functions to accurately
characterize intra- and inter-subject variations [4]. All in all,
genotypic (genetically determined traits, e.g., DNA), pheno-
typic (traits determined through the interaction of genotype,
development, and environment, e.g., fingerprint), and behav-
ioral (traits determined by human activities, e.g., signature)
biometric characteristics are high, medium and low in their
uniqueness strength, respectively [2].
Is there any optimal biometric modality?
No biometric trait is optimal although a number of them
are admissible. Indeed, no single biometric modality effec-
tively meets all of the requirements (e.g., accuracy, size,
cost, practicality, security, acceptability, and stability) of all
the applications (e.g., border crossing, access control, mobile
authentication, and welfare distribution) [2]. The choice of
modality depends on the level of security required and other
factors, such as culture (e.g., face modality would not be a
good choice at places where most of the females use veils for
religious convictions), environment (e.g., iris modality may be
more suitable for workers in dark coal mines), and perception
(e.g., people’s fear regarding use of any specific modality).
On the whole, though iris is regarded as most accurate form
of phenotypic biometrics, there is no impeccable biometric
characteristic [1]. For instance, the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) estimated 1 false match in
40 billion iris comparisons [4].
How can we establish any human features as a novel
biometric?
Besides the existing biometric modalities, any human phys-
iological, behavioral or adhered human characteristic can be
defined as a novel biometric trait, if it satisfies certain basic
criteria, such as universality (each person should possess the
trait), distinctiveness (biometric patterns of two persons should
be different), and permanence (invariant over a period of time)
[2]. Moreover, it practically must meet speed, accuracy, safety
(of the user), acceptance (by users), and hard to be forged
requirements [9].
Do biometric traits change over time?
Yes. Though fundamental premise of any biometric trait is its
persistence, biometric trait undergoes aging [10]. Aging has
profound negative effects on biometric systems, since it causes
alterations (e.g., shape and texture changes in face as also
depicted in Fig. 1d), which subsequently make the enrolled
templates unrepresentative of the query after a certain time
lapse [4]. The biometric aging issue is undertaken by either vir-
tual template synthesis for aging and de-aging transformations
or adaptive mechanisms that continuously adapt the enrolled
templates to the aging variation of the input/query samples [1].
Why does not a biometric system output 100% perfect
match decision?
To better understand the answer of this question, let us first
revisit the five basic components (see Fig. 1b) of a biometric
system. Foremost, there is the sensor to capture the biometric
trait (e.g., a fingerprint) and convert the information to a digital
format. Then, feature extraction module processes the trait to
extract a set of salient features (e.g., fingerprint minutiae);
during enrollment the extracted features known as templates
(XT ) are stored in the database. The matcher module compares
the input/query biometric sample (XQ) with the templates
(XT ) in the database to produce the match scores. Finally, the
decision module makes final decision using a predetermined
threshold [11]. The fundamental premise of a biometric system
is that when a biometric sample is presented, it will produce
correct decision. However, the biometric systems are never
100% accurate. Unlike password or token-based systems,
biometric systems—being inherently probabilistic endeavor—
do not produce perfect match decision [6]. The imperfect
accuracy of biometric systems occurs mainly because two
samples of the same biometric trait belonging to the same
person are not exactly same owing to change in user’s trait
(e.g., bruises and ageing), user’s interaction with the sensor
(e.g., pose), imperfect imaging condition (e.g., sensor noise),
ambient conditions (e.g., illumination), feature representation
limitation (i.e., failing to retain invariances and discriminatory
information in different patterns from the same class), and
poor matching ability [4]. Thus, a biometric system makes
two types of errors: (i) False Match or False Accept Rate
(FMR or FAR) – mistaking biometric samples from two
different persons to be from the same person; (ii) False Non-
Match or False Reject Rate (FNMR or FRR) – mistaking
two biometric samples from the same person to be from
two different persons. Both FMR and FNMR are dependent
on decision threshold and a trade-off between them is opted
based on application and requirements [5, 9]. NIST benchmark
evaluations attained false negative–false positive (%) pair as
0.6–0.01, 4–0.1, and 7–0.1 for fingerprint, face, and voice,
respectively [4].
What are soft biometrics?
Soft biometrics can be expounded as characteristics that pro-
vide some information about the individual, but alone mainly
lack the distinctiveness and permanence to sufficiently differ-
entiate any two individuals [10]. Soft biometrics, also known
as biometric ancillary information, include personal attributes
such as gender, age, ethnicity, hair color, height, weight, etc.
(see Fig. 1d), which can be extracted from primary biometric
traits, namely face, fingerprint and iris. Soft biometrics are
useful in either enhancing the matching accuracy of a primary
biometric system in a fusion framework or pruning the search
biometric databases [15].
III. CURRENT STATUS OF BIOMETRICS
Though biometrics is continuously advancing, it still has a
long way to go. The following five questions, with example
evidence, highlight the current state of biometrics.
Have we already arrived in the future of biometric au-
thentication?
4The future is almost here. Across the globe biometric tech-
nology has virtually arrived in our daily lives ranging from
border crossing, surveillance to mobile devices. Biometric
engineering is already good enough that governments, business
institutions and individuals are exploiting it to curb security
threats, frauds and identity thefts. Governments are employing
biometrics to keep track of who is entering and departing from
their borders, and receiving welfare payments [4], e.g., the
Office of Biometric Identity Management (formerly known
as ‘US-VISIT’) program, i.e., visitors to the US provide
fingerprint and face images at their port of entry that are
matched against various watch-lists [7]. Business institutions
are securing their facilities, websites and proprietary databases
via biometric techniques, e.g., HSBC is providing 15 million
customers its biometric banking software to access online and
phone accounts using their fingerprint or voice1. Likewise,
the masses are accepting and willing to utilize biometric
systems more and more for accessing laptops, mobile phones,
cars, homes, and mobile payments, e.g., Apple iPhone 5s,
Samsung Galaxy S4, and Fujitsu NX F-04G smartphones that
can be automatically unlocked using fingerprint, face, and
iris, respectively. Thanks to the new generation of compact
and cheap sensors, the current biometrics are affordable, user
friendly, fully automatic, real-time, and incorporable into any
everyday used security system.
How are biometric technologies being updated?
Typical biometric systems still use traditional data acquisition
techniques, i.e., either touch-based (e.g., fingerprint), require-
ment of user’s co-operation (e.g., face) or very close encounter
with the scanning device (e.g., iris). Nevertheless, biometric
software and hardware are getting ever more sophisticated. In
terms of hardware, novel sensors based on thermal, ultrasound,
multispectral, 3D, mobile and smart mechanisms are now
available, which are capable of recording biometric samples
in difficult conditions as well [5]. Indeed, touchless sensors,
including ones which scan a biometric pattern directly from
just below the skin’s surface, are presently being incorporated
in commercial products [4]. In terms of software, biometrics
is demonstrably progressing not only to handle heterogeneous
or interoperability but also to increase data-quality, data re-
liability, speed, privacy, and security against attacks [3]. The
perfect marriage of hardware and software advancement has
made ‘on-the-fly’ high-throughput biometric systems possible.
These systems can successfully capture and identify biometric
patterns from individuals in motion even from large distances
[4]. Moreover, offbeat authentication systems based on novel
traits or inter-biometric traits are actively being studied to
bring the systems to individual level [14].
Are computer better than human for biometric recognition
in terms of accuracy?
The answer isn’t so straightforward and not yet settled. This is
largely because of the challenging covariates, such as modality
type, application, ethnicity, and quality of the input samples.
Few studies compared the performance of automated biometric
1http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35609833
systems and humans for face recognition, latent fingerprint
identification and demographic information estimation; the
humans outperformed automated algorithms under difficult
samples (e.g., when very small portion of the biometric trait
sample is available) [1]. However, algorithms based on deep
learning, year by year, tend to reach or even to outperform
humans. Familiarity of the users greatly helped the humans
for better performance in face recognition. Incorporating such
information and human cognition into automated biometric
systems will greatly improve the accuracy; which is still an
open issue [11].
Is biometrics a threat to health?
No. Biometrics has been in use for over 30 years, with no
reported health menaces [1]. There are many evaluation reports
on the health safety of biometrics, which are also used by
governments and institutes to attest to their health hazards,
e.g., ISO/IEC TR 24714-1:2008 report. There do exist health
concerns with touching a sensor (e.g., fingerprint) used by
countless individuals that may transmit infections, which is
identical to those encountered in daily life (e.g., touching a
doorknob). Likewise, iris readers using near-infrared light have
been suspected to damage eyes; this is not true because they
use 750-760nm IR light not lasers/UV lights, and the amount
of this light is no more than would be received by walking
outside on a sunny day. Exciting researches and products are
in progress to counteract this fear; for example development
of contactless/visible spectrum sensors. All in all, biometric
systems including commercial ones pose no health threat, since
they are safety certified by standardizing bodies (e.g., RoHS,
EC) [11].
Are there any biometric standards?
Biometric standards are general rules for collecting, evaluat-
ing, storing, and sharing biometrics [18]. There are several
national and international organizations developing biometric
standards:
i Standards development organizations (SDO): including
ISO/IEC, ITU-T, CEN, ANSI
ii Industry consortia: including BioAPI Consortium, Biomet-
ric Consortium, OASIS, FIDO Alliance (UAF)
iii Other organizations: including ICAO, ILO
SDO, industry consortia and other organizations develop
standards in accordance with their legislative mandates, ob-
jectives of members (e.g., UAF/U2F in Fido alliance; adopted
in many products e.g., Samsung S5 fingerprint scanner), and
particular applications within domain, respectively. Among all,
the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 is more active and
till date has published more than 30 international standards
related to biometric acquisition, evaluation, security, etc.
IV. CURRENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF BIOMETRICS
Despite the progress, a number of key challenging issues are
being faced by biometrics, which are detailed in this section.
What are the key challenges biometrics facing in recent
years?
5Despite recent advances, biometrics still has to deal with many
technical, societal, legal and standardization challenges. The
key technical issue surrounding biometrics is the low perfor-
mances in the wild (also know as unconstrained biometric
recognition) [4]. In the wild, by definition, exhibit large range
of disparity seen in everyday life, which includes variability
in illumination, pose, imaging modalities, and occlusions to
name a few (see Fig. 1e). Similarly, the biometric interoper-
ability (cross-scenarios) between systems, datasets and sensors
are negatively impacting the overall recognition performance.
Also, majority of existing biometric algorithms fails to identify
a person after or before the plastic surgery, since it greatly
alters texture and global appearance of biometric traits [1].
The cultural and social backgrounds are affecting largely
the efficacy of biometrics, too. For instance, some people
avoids to provide their biometrics (e.g., full face image)
due to customary adornments or privacy concerns over how
their biometrics will be used, since there is a supposedly
irrevocable link between biometric traits and personal records.
Presently, biometrics is facing many legal complications such
as acceptance of biometrics as digital signature and biometric
trait’s individuality. Furthermore, though there exists several
biometric standards, a variety of challenges remain unsolved
like patent ambush and application tensions when two stan-
dards have significant differences [18].
Is biometric negative identification an issue?
Biometrics can be categorized in ‘positive’ and ‘negative’
identification modes [1]. In positive identification, the user
submits willingly their biometric trait with their identity to
the system. The system affirms the match by comparing
the submitted trait only against his/her traits in the template
database. While, negative identification does not demand any
identity claim by the user. Here, the user’s biometric trait is
compared generally against all the individuals’ trait in the
database to ascertain the identity [2]. The traditional person
recognition techniques (e.g., passwords) work for positive
recognition; only biometrics can be used for negative iden-
tification [4]. The prime aim of negative identification is to
prevent an individual from using multiple identities (e.g., the
passport issuing authority can check that the applicant does
not already have a passport under different name). Perhaps,
the well-known negative identification system is the ‘US-
VISIT’. However, negative identification carry several risks,
such as use of biometric trait (e.g., fingerprint) either as a
linking identifier across disparate databases without people’s
consent or for completely unrelated purposes, which lead
thus to infringement on civil liberties and privacy [11]. Most
importantly the result of a false match in negative identification
may get wrong person either convicted or denied the access.
The ongoing standardization (within and between industry
and nations) plans to share and unify the databases, which
would potentially put one’s entire life history in interoperating
databases that would be only a biometric trait away. Simi-
larly, negative identification can also empower racist or ageist
approaches of stigmatization and exclusion, since ancillary
information, such as ethnicity, gender and age can be extracted
from primary biometric traits viz., face, fingerprint and iris
[15].
What about the missing data in multibiometric systems?
Since multibiometric systems (i.e., systems that consolidate the
evidences from two or more biometric traits) provide several
advantages (e.g., lower error rates), thus large-scale systems
are increasingly becoming multimodal (e.g., US-VISIT) [2].
However, multimodal systems frequently encounter the miss-
ing data problem. For instance, an enrolled user of a face
and fingerprint based system may have lost his/her fingers in
an accident. Likewise, only subset of modalities was obtained
from the crime scene. The missing data scenario may occur
owing to missing modalities either in template, query or
incomplete score information from the individual matchers.
There exist solutions (e.g., extended likelihood ratio-based
score fusion [4]) that are capable to tackle above outlined three
kinds of missing data successfully without compromising the
accuracy [2].
Can biometrics differentiate identical twins?
Identical twins have the closest genetics-based relationship;
therefore maximum similarity between their biometric traits
is expected to be found among them [1]. Recent advances
have made it possible to successfully distinguish identical
twins using their fingerprint, retina, iris, thermogram or face,
when minute details (e.g., moles) or motion information are
incorporated. Also, scientists have lately developed a DNA
based genetic test that can distinguish between identical twins,
and is currently being used in the courts. It is found that
unimodal biometric systems exhibit a slightly lower accuracy
for identifying twins than non-twins. However, multibiometric
systems (e.g., fingerprint with iris) have shown remarkable
improvement in identical twins verifications [4].
Are there big data issues in biometrics as well?
Broadly speaking, big data in biometrics is the collection and
analysis of millions biometrics-related data of many sorts for
completely diverse purposes and with different properties, such
as usability, availability, reliability, maintainability, privacy,
security, performance, and so on [4]. For instance, UIDAI
(Unique Identification Authority of India) is a system that
provides identity to all persons (i.e., 1.25 billion) resident in
India using biometrics. Like any other big data system, bio-
metrics is also facing four main challenges: volume (database
size), velocity (response/processing-time), veracity (robust to
fraudulent), and variety (multiple biometric identifiers). It is
a very active research field to devise big data techniques
addressing these challenges in various biometrics scenarios,
while eliminating risk, privacy and accuracy concerns.
V. HOT TOPICS IN BIOMETRICS
This section presents an overview of most noticeable recent
topics (trends) that aim to make authentication more conve-
nient and secure.
6How are novel biometric traits in smartphones different
from well-established modalities?
Smartphones are rapidly becoming data hubs and being used
for storing e-mail, personal photos, online history, passwords,
and online banking including payment information. Therefore,
they require a high level of security. Consequently, traditional
well-established biometric traits (such as face, fingerprint,
and iris) are continuously being studied and incorporated in
commercial mobile devices. The state-of-the-art in mobile
fingerprint, face, iris, voice, keystroke-, and touch-dynamics
recognition attain 2.0%, 3.58%, 0.05%, 0.47%, 3.6%, and
3.5% EER, respectively [5]. Nevertheless, most of the users
do not either use biometrics or password to protect their de-
vice2 because of time consumption for authentication3 and/or
demand of co-operation using traditional traits. But, mobile
devices also possess other sensors, such as accelerometer,
magnetometer, gyroscope, GPS, barometer, proximity sensors,
and touchscreen (see Fig. 1a), which might also assist in user
authentication by deriving novel mobile behavioral biometric
traits, such as scrolling patterns, phone movement [5]. In
fact, research on novel mobile biometrics using these sen-
sors is progressively emerging. Contrary to traditional traits,
novel mobile biometric traits are unobtrusive, user-friendly,
fast, continuous, invisible, hard-to-spoof, and require minimal
interaction for authentication. However, there are still several
challenging problems in improving privacy, security, usability,
and ergonomics of novel mobile biometrics [5].
Why are behavioral biometrics getting so much attention
now?
Contrary to physical biometrics that involve innate human
characteristics (e.g., fingerprint), behavioral biometrics identi-
fies an individual using not what they are, but what/how they
do certain activities [9]. Behavioral biometrics are immensely
vital for surveillance, particularly towards identifying critical
events before or as they happen. Examples of behavioral bio-
metrics are gait, voice, mouse/keyboard use attributes, touch
screen patterns on mobile devices, cognitive, and interaction
with various websites/apps. Behavioral biometrics provide a
higher level of accuracy and security, especially when they are
fused with data from mobile/wearable device’s in-built sensors
(e.g., accelerometer and gyroscope), which are comparatively
difficult to be mimicked, besides multibiometrics making it
harder for an intruder to spoof several biometric traits simulta-
neously [2]. Moreover, since most of the behavioral biometrics
are non-invasive, frictionless, unobtrusive, and hard to spoof
(e.g., it is almost impossible spoofing the phone movements of
users performing ‘phone-hold signals and touchscreen’ based
multimodal authentication), they are therefore gaining now so
much momentum.
How is biometric privacy concern being addressed?
The growth in use of biometrics has also escalated concerns
2This way, users leave their personal information accessible to malicious
individuals (www.kpcb.com/insights/2013-internet-trends).
3The average smartphone user checks their device 150 times per day. If
unlocking the device takes 2 seconds, the typical user spends 5 minutes un-
locking their device every day (www.kpcb.com/insights/2013-internet-trends).
about individual’s privacy and data security. Biometrics can
also be misused for unintended purposes against one’s will, as
biometric data also reveals additional information, such as age,
race and certain genetic disorders4 that can be extracted by
automated schemes [10]. Efforts are afoot to design privacy-
preservation (also known as de-identification or changeability)
algorithms to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized disclo-
sure of such personal attributes [4]. The implicit aim of
de-identification is to protect privacy while preserving data
utility. In privacy-preservation, biometric data content may be
altered to remove or obfuscate personal information. Another
track being pursued specially to decrease privacy concerns is
legislation by governments (e.g., European Union constitution
against sharing biometric identifiers and personal information)
and assurance by biometric vendors to adhere to a set of
ethical guidelines in their product design [18]. Nevertheless, it
is worth mentioning that an individual can not be recognized
from just a random photograph without associated metadata.
Besides DNA, can any other biometric trait be employed
to verify the kinship?
Yes. Face biometrics can also be used for kin recognition.
Kinship verification from facial images is a relatively new
research arena in biometrics, which aims at training the
machine to determine automatically whether there is a kin
relation between a pair of given face images [4]. The kinship
is defined as a relationship between two persons who are
biologically related with overlapping genes. Potential appli-
cations for kinship verification are family album organization,
genealogical research, missing family members search, assist-
ing legitimate immigrants and victims of trafficking. Current
kinship verification algorithms attain accuracy ranging from
70 to 80% [1].
Does 3D biometrics overcome the drawbacks of traditional
2D systems?
2D biometric systems use two-dimensional intensity images,
and achieve good performance under constrained environ-
ments. They still however encounter difficulties in handling
large amounts of variations owing to lighting conditions,
poses, occlusion, etc. [4]. While, 3D biometric technology is
an emerging trend that utilizes three-dimensional geometric
information of biometric traits and holds great promise. 3D
systems perform inherently robust and better than traditional
2D systems under these variations [14], besides taking us
towards much demanded touchless biometrics. Nevertheless,
3D biometric technologies are yet not much robust to ex-
pression, facial hair, and large occlusions in face recognition.
A lot of research is undergoing into 3D and 2D interplay,
such as how to match one to the other (e.g., iterative closest
point algorithm), how to obtain one from the other (e.g.,
polygonalmes), how to fuse 2D and 3D information (e.g.,
competitive fusion), and how to utilise one to constrain the
other (e.g., serial fusion of modalities/features).
4For example, certain malformed fingers might be statistically correlated
with certain genetic disorders [11].
7VI. SECURITY OF BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
Like any conventional security system, biometrics can suffer
malicious adversaries, who may manipulate data to compro-
mise its integrity. Here are few most commonly asked security
questions.
What are the points where a biometric system can be
compromised?
The security of biometric systems can be compromised at
eight possible different points [3, 11] as shown in Fig. 1f.
Attacks from point 1 are carried out at the sensor using fake
biometric traits, also known as presentation or spoofing attacks
[3]. Attacks from points 2, 4 and 7 exploits possible weak
points in the communication channels and try to intercept
or insert information into the channel. Points 3, 5, 6 and 8
may be performed as Trojan Horse attacks to bypass the fea-
ture extractor, the matcher, the system database and decision
modules. These vulnerabilities may cause denial-of-service,
intrusion, and privacy erosion due to function creep [5].
Numerous techniques to mitigate biometric security risks have
been developed, which we will discuss below in consequent
questions.
Anyway, biometrics has various security advantages over
traditional ‘what you know’ and ‘what you have’ authentica-
tions. For instance, most passwords are simple (e.g., nickname)
or regular dictionary words (e.g., university) that can be easily
guessed, hacked, borrowed, or stolen. Token are prone to loss,
duplication, sharing, or theft. Moreover, passwords/tokens are
unable to provide nonrepudiation. While, biometrics offers
the property of nonrepudiation and de-duplication, and cannot
be lost, forgotten, shared or distributed [9]. Though, many
biometrics are not secret leading thus to spoofing, biometric
forging requires more time, experience, and access privileges.
Additionally, behavioral biometrics (particularly mobile traits,
e.g., touchscreen) provide normally stronger security than
physical traits (e.g., face), since they demand advanced tech-
nical skills to be spoofed [3].
Is spoofing another serious concern to biometrics?
Biometric spoofing is a procedure in which a biometric system
may be subverted by masquerading as registered user, and
thereby gaining illegitimate access and advantages [7]. For
example, presenting a face mask to the system (see Fig. 1g).
Spoofing attacks are still a major concern (e.g., just two
days after the iPhone5s hit the market, it was fooled by
a fingerprint spoof), but several countermeasures have been
developed. For instance, the liveness detection methods that
exploit physiological signs (e.g., eye blinking) to determine
whether there is a live person or an artificial replica in front
of the biometric sensor [3]. Similarly, novel sensors are also
available that can detect spoofing attacks themselves [3].
What are the biometric ‘hill-climbing’ and ‘brute-force’
attacks?
The hill-climbing attacks on biometrics consist of submitting
synthetic biometric representations iteratively to the system
and, according to the output match score, modifying such
data randomly until the acceptance threshold is exceeded.
While, brute-force attacks are performed by submitting real
biometric samples to the systems until the system wrongly
accepts one as of the genuine user [3]. These two attacks can
be perpetrated both at feature extraction module (type 2 in Fig.
1f), where input image is modified till successful recognition
is achieved, and at matcher module (type 4 in Fig. 1f), where
synthetic random templates are perturbed until the decision
threshold is surpassed. To crack the system successfully,
the hill-climbing attacks require less resources and efforts
than brute-force attacks. In fact, the attacker in brute-force
must have a data set containing thousands of real biometric
samples in order to efficiently fool the system, whereas no real
biometric samples are needed in hill-climbing attacks. Further,
if we compare the robustness of biometrics and password-
based security systems, then passwords are easy to be cracked
by brute-force dictionary attacks or by simple guessing [6, 9].
For instance, suppose that a biometric verification system is
operating at 0.001% FAR. A 0.001% FAR also indicates that
1 out of 100,000 brute force attacks on an average will be
successful. While, if we consider this as an equivalent to the
robustness offered by a randomly chosen five-digit PIN, then
a brute-force attack against a five-digit PIN will require only
50,000 attempts on an average to intrude the system.
What does biometric evasion and obfuscation mean?
Surveillance and forensic applications include the detection
task, e.g., detecting known speakers in intercepted conver-
sations. The threat here involves evasion and obfuscation,
whereby the person of interest may seek to provoke a missed
detection. When a person intentionally alters their own bio-
metric trait to target detection module is known as evasion.
When recognition module is targeted, it is called obfuscation
[3]. Contrary to spoofing, the aim of evasion and obfuscation is
not being falsely accepted, but to avoid being either detected or
identified by one’s true identity mainly in the case of surveil-
lance and forensics. For instance, use of face occlusion/make-
up/plastic-surgery or fingerprint alternation. The evasion or
obfuscation attacks target two distinctly different components
of a typical biometric systems as illustrated in Fig. 1h. In
recent years, methods (e.g., biometric alternation detection [4])
to detect such attacks have been developed.
Is it possible to reverse-engineer a biometric trait sample
from a biometric template?
Yes. Template is a compact description of original data,
and it is not contemplated, by definition, to disclose crucial
information about original biometric sample. Therefore, it was
traditionally believed that template does not contain enough
information to allow reconstruction of original sample [5].
In other words, template generation techniques have been
presumed to be “one-way” schemes. But, recent studies on
inverse biometrics have questioned this common belief, and
designed techniques to regenerate original samples from its
templates [1]. However, inverse biometrics can be thwarted by
cancelable biometrics or biometric cryptosystem that generates
cryptographic keys based on biometric samples to protect not
8only templates but also user’s privacy [4].
Can biometrics be reissued like passwords when compro-
mised?
Biometrics is permanent corporeal attribute of a person, and
cannot be physically replaced when compromised. To address
this problem, a novel technique called ‘cancelable biometrics’
has been lately developed [11]. The basic idea of this approach
is that instead of storing the original template, it is the
mathematically transformed template that is stored in the
enrolment database. In particular, a transformation function
(z) is applied to the biometric template (XT ), and only the
transformed template (z(XT ;K)) is stored in the database;
where K is the parameter that characterizes the z. Like pass-
words, these transformed templates when compromised can
be revoked and reissued, since whenever the transformation
function/parameter is changed new revocable or cancelable
templates are produced [3].
VII. FUTURE OF BIOMETRICS
Interdisciplinary researchers are leaping into the world of
biometrics to develop novel unobtrusive future biometric traits.
Some questions related to future are examined here.
Wearable biometrics: Fad or the Future?
Wearable biometrics refers to person identification technology
incorporated into items of garments and/or accessories that
can read, record, and compare individual’s biometric traits
such as heart rate, respiratory rate, or any type of physical
activity [6]. Examples of wearable devices are smart watches,
bands, ear-pods, jewelry, eyeglasses, contact lenses and cloth-
ing. Wearable biometrics has tendency to provide seamlessly
continuous authentication without user’s interaction, efforts
and cooperation [5]. Slowly but surely, wearable biometric
devices will become crucial physical extensions of our lives to
digitally unlock our every day physical and virtual lives–from
car to communications, home security to banking, healthcare
to other services. Soon, a more sophisticated insights of
Electroencephalography (EEG), electrocardiogram (ECG) and
Electromyography (EMG) patterns in wearables would help
gauging our likes and dislikes for entertainment, smart home
controlling, and interactive gaming beside the identification
[6]. Wearable biometrics will only continue to grow becoming
sooner or later a universal authenticator that intuitively knows
who we are, where we are, what we want to do. In fact, latest
analysis report has forecast that by 2019 globally there will
be 604 million users of wearable biometrics5.
Is it possible to identify individuals based on their brain-
waves?
Yes. Researchers have devised a technique to identify people
by their brain activities or brainwaves (formally known as
EEG). The system recognizes individuals by monitoring the
unique patterns of electrical activities within the brain in
5http://www.planetbiometrics.com/article-details/i/2341/desc/wearables-to-
drive-second-wave-of-biometric-adoption-report/
response to certain words [8]. Such neurological responses
are known as ‘Brainprint’, which are recorded using an estab-
lished method called electroencephalogram (EEG). This novel
biometrics is like a fingerprint for your brain signal, but its
usability and acceptability hitherto is rather limited owing to
requirement of user wearing an EEG cap and a medium level
accuracy of current recognition algorithms [8].
Can wi-fi signals identify and track people even through
walls?
Very lately, researchers have developed a system named RF-
capture, which can identify and track people even through
walls using just wi-fi signals [12]. The RF-capture uses radio
frequency signals—which can traverse walls and reflect off
the human body—to capture ‘reflections patterns’ (i.e., the
representative silhouette human figure) in order to detect,
track or identify the person even if he/she is fully occluded.
Nevertheless, RF-capture’s accuracy decreases with increase
in number of users to be identified, e.g., accuracy deceases to
88% for 15 subjects [12].
Can GPS (Global Positioning System) information be used
to identify individuals?
Yes. With the advent of portable devices (e.g., smartphones,
tablets) equipped with GPS, Bluetooth and WiFi sensors, the
location and mobility data could be easily collected. Pattern
of movements and locations, when traced on a map, creates
something akin to a fingerprint that is unique to each individ-
ual; known as ‘GPS fingerprint’ or ‘digital footprint’. One can
identify ‘who you are’ by tracing your mobile device’s location
data [14]. The study showed that only four spatio-temporal
points are enough to uniquely identify 95% of the individuals
[14]. Other publicly available information (e.g., a person’s
home or work address and geo-localized tweet) together with
GPS fingerprint may also be used to re-identify the person
with enhanced accuracy. This raises the individuals’ privacy
and security issues. Since, the ‘de-anonymization’ attack6 can
be used not only for identification but also linking back to their
personal data. For instance, burglars can plan house breaking
according to digital fingerprint when successfully linked to
the home address. Likewise, insurance companies can track
frequent hospital visits; interpreting it as indicator for bad
health. GPS based identification has to go a long way since it is
very prone to misclassification when two or more individuals’
paths cross or GPS precisions are coarsened, besides devising
techniques to anonymize GPS data while maximizing utility
[14].
Can we identify users of social networks by their data
footprint?
It is possible to uniquely identify the users of social networks
over the time, since the data generated by a social network user
leaves a viable trail of data that can serve as a unique identifier
just like the human fingerprint, which is named as ‘social
fingerprinting’ [17]. A social fingerprint mainly contains three
6When an adversary tries to infer the identity of a particular individual
behind a set of location and mobility traces.
9overarching types of information: the initiator, the selected
activity, and the recipient. On any given social network, a
user chooses how to engage with the network and a specific
recipient of the action. For instance, on Twitter, users can
reply to, favorite, or re-tweet the information of other users.
It is worth emphasizing that large-scale evaluation study has
yet to be conducted to substantiate the findings of existing
researches. Moreover, current social fingerprinting techniques
are applicable to single social networking data and struggle to
handle missing/incorrect profile attributes [17].
Is it true that face can be reconstructed from DNA?
Of late, researchers have studied the ways genes influence
facial development, and devised mathematically a computer
program that can construct facial features of a person using
genetic markers from their DNA. This technique is known
as ‘DNA phenotyping’ or ‘molecular photo fitting’ [14]. The
recreated face includes fairly accurate everything from skin
tone to eye color, hair color, ancestry, and freckling. Yet, age,
baldness and hair curliness are tough parameters to predict
and to reconstruct in the face. Nevertheless, the technique is
expected, in the near future, to recreate faces of extinct human
relatives. Though, the developed technique is in its infancy, it
is still quite useful for law enforcement agencies to hunt down
the suspects. The prospect of widespread DNA phenotyping
has unnerved many experts. Some scientists are questioning
the accuracy of the techniques, while others are cynical about
the technique being used for racial profiling among law
enforcement agencies, besides infringing on privacy and taking
civil liberties into uncharted waters.
What will biometrics do in the next twenty years?
Though biometrics is not new, day by day it is becoming
increasingly mainstream thanks to the growth of mobile and
wearable devices [6]. We can see glimpses of what biometric
future will look like. Advances in existing and novel biometric
traits are providing better security and more accurate ways to
identify people. Arrival of this trend, within the next ten years,
promises to revolutionize aspects of life using synergistic mul-
tiple biometrics for eGoverment, eHealth, eBanking, eBanking
and Smart Homes, etc. [9]. In other words, biometrics in the
future will matter more than ever. Though it is too early to
predict the exact essence of biometrics in the future, it is
undeniable that there will be no way around biometrics-based
recognition.
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